NAAMJP FILES LAWSUIT CHALLENING NEW JERSEY FEDERAL LOCAL RULES BAR ADMISSION DISCRIMINATION
National Association for the Advancement of Multijurisdictional Practice v. Simandle1:14-cv- 03678 filed in District Court of New Jersey on June 9, 2014 targets federal court rules that favors N.J. Lawyers' bar admission and categorically excludes lawyers from 49 States and the District of Columbia.
In a nutshell, the Complaint alleges:
1. The First Amendment provides that Congress shall make no law abridging the freedoms of speech, association, and to petition the government for the redress of grievances. Courts, too, are bound by the First Amendment. The United States Supreme Court has squarely held that bar admission on motion for out-of-state attorneys is constitutionally protected, and the norm for bar admission on motion is comity. Supreme Court of Virginia v. Friedman, 487 U.S. 59 (1988). The United States Supreme Court has also held “the location of a lawyer's office simply has nothing to do with his or her intellectual ability or experience in litigating cases in Federal District Court.” Frazier v. Heebe, Chief Judge, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana et. al, 482 U.S. 641, 649 (1987)(holding pro hac vice admission is not a reasonable alternative for an out-of-state attorney who seeks general admission to the District Court, and invalidating Local Rule that excluded out-of-state attorneys.)
2. New Jersey LCivR 101(a) provides, “Any attorney licensed to practice by the Supreme Court of New Jersey may be admitted as an attorney at law on motion of a member of the bar of this Court, made in open court, and upon taking the prescribed oath and signing the roll.” LCivR 101(a) thus categorically denies general bar admission privileges to the Plaintiffs, and all otherwise qualified lawyers in good standing admitted to the bar of 49 other States and the District of Columbia. LCivR 101(e) provides an exception for admission for patent lawyers who are not members of the New Jersey Supreme Court, if they have an office in New Jersey for two years. Plaintiffs aver LCivR 101(a) and (e) contradicts Friedman because it abridges the constitutional norm of reciprocal admission by limiting general bar admission privileges to members of the New Jersey Supreme Court. Plaintiffs aver LCivR 101(e) contradicts Frazier because where a patent lawyer, or any lawyer has his office has nothing what so ever to do with intellectual ability or experience with litigation in the Federal District Court.
3. Additionally, New Jersey LCivR 101(i) authorizes any attorney in good standing regardless of State admission to represent any criminal defendant. New Jersey LCivR 101(f) authorizes any attorney in good standing regardless of State admission to represent the United States. Thus, under LCivR 101(i) and 101(f) both criminals and the United States have an unfettered constitutional right to counsel and access to the U.S. District Court, but on the other hand, Plaintiffs and otherwise qualified lawyers in good standing from 49 States and the District of Columbia are categorically denied these constitutional rights.
4. Plaintiffs aver LCivR 101(a) is an irrational overbroad classification scheme and a prior restraint that has nothing what-so-ever to do with an attorney’s competence or fitness to practice federal law in the Federal District Court; that it serves no legitimate governmental purpose; that it has the practical effect of perpetuating a stereotype and targeting and retaliating against a locally unpopular group in the exercise of their First Amendment freedoms to speech, association, and to petition for the redress of grievances; that it is unlawful under the Rules Enabling Act; that it unlawfully inverts the Supremacy Clause by allowing state law to trump federal law; that it has the practical effect of providing monopoly protection for Garden State licensed lawyers; that it is an antiquated guild-like vestige from a bygone era that continues to exist in this 21st Century because of inertia. Plaintiffs seek Declaratory and Injunctive Relief providing reciprocal general admission privileges for all sister-state attorneys regardless of what State Supreme Court they are admitted and in good standing, and regardless of where they have their principal office, and despite whether they practice criminal, civil, or patent law.
The NAAMJP filed a suit in December 2013 over a District of Columbia rule that limits admissions there to lawyers admitted in the local jurisdiction or in jurisdictions with reciprocal admissions of Washington-admitted attorneys. In March, the District of Columbia announced it would propose rules allowing any lawyer in good standing and admitted to any state’s highest court to be admitted on motion in the district’s federal court. The NAAMJP has also brought challenges to state-court rules barring admission by motion in Arizona, California and Pennsylvania that are pending.
I. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION for the ADVANCEMENT of MULTIJURISDICTION
PRACTICE v. Richard W. Roberts, 2:13-cv-07382 filed in and challenging the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia’s retaliatory tit-for-tat bar admission rules.
The First Amendment provides that Congress shall make no law abridging the freedoms of speech, association, and to petition the government for the redress of grievances. Courts, too, are bound by the First Amendment. The United States Supreme Court has squarely held that bar admission on motion for out-of-state attorneys is constitutionally protected, and the norm for bar admission on motion is comity. Supreme Court of Virginia v. Friedman, 487 U.S. 59 (1988). The United States Supreme Court has held “the location of a lawyer's office simply has nothing to do with his or her intellectual ability or experience in litigating cases in Federal District Court.” Frazier v. Heebe, Chief Judge, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana et. al, 482 U.S. 641, 649 (1987)
2. District of Columbia LCvR 83.8 provides, Admission to and continuing membership in the Bar of this Court are limited to attorneys who are
“(2) active members in good standing of the highest court of any state in which the attorney maintains his/her principal law office and is a member in good standing of a United States District Court that provides for reciprocal admission to members of the Bar of this Court.”
LCvR 83.8(a)(2) contradicts the norm of reciprocal admission by limiting general bar admission privileges to members of the bar of 25 out of the 94 U.S. District Courts. These preferred 25 District Courts, that by Local Rules provide reciprocal admission to members of the bar of U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, are located in only 15 states. Plaintiffs aver LCvR 83.8(a)(2) that facially discriminates against otherwise qualified attorneys admitted in the remaining District Courts and States offends the constitutional norm of comity; LCvR 83.8(a)(2) has nothing what so ever to do with intellectual ability or experience in federal court; it is irrational serving no legitimate governmental purpose; it is unlawful under the Rules Enabling Act, and it is an antiquated vestige from a bygone era. Plaintiffs seek Declaratory and Injunctive Relief providing reciprocal general admission privileges for all sister-state attorneys regardless of what District Court they are admitted, regardless of what state they are admitted and in good standing, and regardless of where they have their principal office.
II. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION for the ADVANCEMENT of MULTIJURISDICTION
PRACTICE v. HON. CHIEF JUSTICE RONALD D. CASTILLE, HON. THOMAS G. SAYLOR 2:13-cv-07382 filed in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and challenging Pennsylvania’s retaliatory tit-for-tat bar admission rules.
The injustice in this case can be understood by analogy. Assume the owner of the Philadelphia Eagles wants to retain the best quarterback. He chooses either San Francisco 49er Colin Kaepernick or Baltimore Raven Joe Flacco to be his quarterback, the representative face of his franchise. Both quarterbacks are available free agents wanting to play for the Eagles. In America — our pledge of allegiance is “one nation, under God, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all.” Joe Flacco and Colin Kaepernick are free to play for the Eagles, or the Pittsburgh Steelers, or any other professional football team. But if they are lawyers by profession, they cannot play or represent clients in the Keystone State under Pa. B.A.R. 204. The sole reason they are denied the Privileges and Immunities of American citizenship is because they come from non-reciprocity states. If lawyers Kaepernick and Flacco, however, are from 38 other states and the District of Columbia that Pennsylvania has reciprocity with, they can practice law in Pennsylvania. But since they come from one of the 12 non-reciprocity states, and although they are admittedly otherwise qualified, they are deprived of their citizenship rights by Pa. B.A.R. 204, injuring them, and depriving Pennsylvania citizens of their professional services. Plaintiffs assert Pa. B.A.R. 204 in practical effect is unlawful retaliation, arbitrary and irrational serving no legitimate state interest, archaic, and unconstitutional.
III. NAAMJP, et. al. v REBECCA WHITE BERCH, et. al 9th Circuit Docket challenging Arizona’s retaliatory tit-for-tat bar admission rule.
Statement of Issues Presented
1. Twenty-six states have tit-for-tat bar admission on motion rules for experienced attorneys. Appellants challenge Arizona’s tit-for-tat bar admission rule for experienced sister-state attorneys. Arizona admitted in the District Court that the sole purpose for this provision is to retaliate against states that deny bar admission on motion to Arizona licensed lawyers. The issue here is whether Arizona’s restrictive rule for otherwise qualified attorneys violates the 14th Amendment Equal Protection Clause under a rational basis standard of review?
2. The United States Supreme Court has squarely held bar admission on motion is a constitutionally protected privilege and immunity, and that discrimination against otherwise qualified attorneys on the basis of state residence or citizenship is unconstitutional. Supreme Court of Virginia v. Friedman, 487 U.S. 59 (1998). In Friedman, the Supreme Court rejected every justification Virginia proffered for its discrimination in bar admission on motion; including the Virginia Supreme Court argument that the attorney’s privilege and immunity to practice law was not abridged because Ms. Friedman could take an examination and, upon passing, she could gain the right to practice law. Id. at 67. The norm under the Privileges and Immunities Clause is comity, i.e. equal treatment. Id. at 64. (Emphasis added) Does Arizona’s tit-for-tat rule on admission, that admittedly disqualifies the otherwise qualified Appellants, violate the Article IV Sec. 2 and 14th Amendment Privileges and Immunities Clauses? Stated differently, is there a legitimate and constitutional exception for retaliation under the Privileges and Immunities Clauses as the Magistrate Judge ruled?
3. Is Arizona’s admission retaliation rule, applied against experienced attorneys from 11 disfavored states unconstitutional as being overbroad or a prior restraint? Does requiring qualified attorneys’ from disfavored states to again pass an entry level bar exam, judged by examiners whose bias is demonstrated by the retaliatory restrictions in their admission rule requirement, constitute content, speaker, or viewpoint discrimination? Does this retaliation violate the Appellants’ First Amendment association and petition freedoms?
IV. NAAMJP files lawsuit challenging U.S. District Court "Local" Rules in the Ninth Circuit that Deny General Admission Privileges to Non-Forum State Attorneys. WALLS BLYE, et al. v. California Supreme Court 11-5046-DWM. The Complaint also seeks Injunctive & Declaratory Relief Invalidating the California Experienced Attorney's Bar Exam and Petition for full licensing privileges for In-House Counsel & Registered Legal Services Attorneys (PDF Format) The NAAMJP has filed a Motion for Summary Judgment with seventeen exhibits.
SUMMARY OF COMPLAINT
American Bar Association Conclusions Supporting Reciprocal Admission
1. The US Supreme Court has held that professional norms articulated by the American Bar Association are "(s)tandards to which we have referred as ‘guides to determining what is reasonable.’" Wiggins v. Smith, 539 US 510, 524 (2003). The American Bar Association Report of the Commission on Multijurisdictional Practice (2002) carefully studied Client Needs in the 21st Century in open hearings held all over the United States, recommending State’s adopt admission on motion for experienced attorneys, concluding the requirement and ritual of taking another bar exam injures the public. This ABA conclusion was facilitated by revolutionary changes in technology and increasing globalization, endorsed by the Conference of Chief Justices, and adopted in 39 States. The ABA also recommended that U.S. District Courts eliminate “local” rules that deny reciprocal general admission privileges to experienced sister-state attorneys from outside the forum State because such discriminatory rules — are anti-competitive, inefficient, drive up the costs of litigation, and interfere with the right to counsel of choice.
2. The ABA MacCrate Study on Lawyer Competence Finds Bar Exams Test Only One of Ten Essential Lawyer Skills.
Cognitive Scientific Findings On Expertise and Expert Performance Support Reciprocal Admission
3. The ABA’s recommendation for reciprocal licensing on motion for experienced attorneys is collaterally reinforced by scientific findings from the field of expertise and expert performance. See K. Anders Ericsson, Ed., The Cambridge Handbook of Expertise and Expert Performance (Cambridge University Press 2006).
Scientists have concluded that it takes 10,000 hours to develop true expertise in any field, taking the brain this long to assimilate all that it needs to know to achieve true mastery. Experienced experts surpass novices, those new to a profession, in seven major ways: (a) generating the best solution; (b) pattern recognition; (c) qualitative analysis; (d) self-monitoring skills in terms of their ability and knowing what they don’t know; (e) choosing appropriate strategies; (f) seeing and exploiting opportunities; and (g) cognitive effort, meaning they work faster, with less effort, and greater control. Id. at 27. Cognitive scientists have concluded the highest levels of expertise, like Tiger Woods golf swing at the Masters on the 18th hole, or Newton postulating the laws of gravity “in a contemplative mood …occasioned by the fall of an apple,” are characterized by contextually based intuitive actions that are automatic, sub-conscious, and difficult or impossible to report verbally. Thus, the rule of thumb that one State’s lawyers are more competent to practice law than another State’s lawyers — a theory born in the 1930s separate but equal era — has been rejected by the ABA, empirically refuted by cognitive science, and disavowed by the High Court in Supreme Court of Virginia v. Friedman, 487 U.S. 59 (1988)(holding that bar admission on motion is constitutionally protected).
4. Dr. Norman is one of the experts writing a chapter in the Cambridge Handbook of Expertise and Expert Performance, supra. Dr. Norman writes:
“Study after study has shown that it is almost impossible to get judges to agree on scores for essay answers."
5. Evolutionary psychology concludes we have modules in our brains that have evolved from natural selection, similar to the modules in our brains where speaking (Broca’s area) and
listening to words (Wernicke’s area) is processed, to exclude humans and to be aggressive and prejudiced against people who are not members of our primary group. See Stephen P. Hinshaw, Chapter 22 “Roots of Religion, Aggression, and Prejudice,” Origins of the Human Mind (Teaching Company 2010) p. 144. A trigger for aggression and prejudice is out-group status, coming from a different family, group, or religion. “We wish to vanquish, dominate, or even annihilate the oppressed group, lest they oppress us; and we developed a set of cognitive strategies to tell ourselves that we are superior to these out groups.” Id. at 146. We tend to stigmatize them, pre-judge them, and discriminate against them so that we can feel superior to them; as Hitler did with his ethnic cleansing against Jews, blacks, gays, and lesbians for the purity of the Aryan race; as the local Rules do against plaintiffs and other American citizens.
The California Experienced Attorneys’ Bar Exam Fails to Meet Testing Standards
6. The sacred cow — the popularly held belief that the California bar exam for experienced sister-state attorneys is the gold standard — is a myth proved false under examination. Five nationally respected testing experts, including experts from the National Conference of Bar Examiners and the California State Bar’s own testing expert, have concluded similar 100% subjective high-stakes licensing tests are not valid or reliable measuring devices. There are standard statistical indices for the reliability of test scores. The most basic of these is the standard error of measurement. A reliability coefficient can be defined in terms of the average magnitude of the standard error. Indisputable evidence proves this licensing test, exam after exam, has a standard measurement error greater than 52%, and sometimes a 60% error rate, when the industry standard is preferably a
10% error rate. These 100% subjective tests fail to meet well established testing Standards. Moreover, these test results are inadmissible in federal court under Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993) and the Federal Rules of Evidence 700 series. There is no cause and effect nexus between practice in the U.S. District Courts and this licensing test.
7. There are other fundamental deficiencies in giving subjective entry level licensing tests to experienced attorneys. Knowledge and skill acquired after licensing from self-development and experience cannot be tested for several reasons. First, there is the matter of jurisdiction. No State bar exam tests many exclusive areas of federal practice such as patents, intellectual property, copyrights, trademarks, bankruptcy, immigration, admiralty, and federal taxation. Second, one cannot be an expert without experience. It is well known that “practice makes perfect.” There is a biological basis for this truth: Neurons that fire together wire together. Synaptic connections become stronger with use. The more you do something the better you get at it. Third, the cognitive science of Expertise and Expert Performance proves after licensing, acquired knowledge is often subconscious, intuitive and cannot be tested. Cognitive science illustrates there is an enormous difference between those new to a profession and experienced experts. That difference is intuitive pattern recognition formed by experience. Dr. Norman writes:
“Studies of expertise in many other domains — chess, computer programming, physics — show substantially the same thing. Experts become experts by amassing a huge body of both formal and experiential knowledge.” Id. at 20.
8. Plaintiff MARINNA CALLAWAY is an African-American attorney with over 20 years experience in federal and criminal law. Plaintiff has over 40,000 hours of unblemished attorney experience. Plaintiff, like many other Americans, recently
moved to another State because of her husband’s opportunity to advance his career. Plaintiff is stigmatized and injured personally, professionally, and economically by being denied federal general bar admission privileges because of the California U.S. District Court closed shop
"local" rule that concludes she is unfit to practice federal law because she is not a member of the
"in-group" and deified State Bar of California. As in Plessy v. Ferguson 163 U.S. 537 (1896), where in the 1890s, Homer Plessy, who was 1/8th black, was barred from riding in a “Whites only” train car by Louisiana State law, Plaintiff is categorically disqualified from general bar admission privileges because the California Federal District Court “local” Rules exclusively borrow California state bar admission rules,
violating In Re Poole, supra, and a century of Supreme Court precedent holding the State and federal court bars are each distinct and autonomous.
By local Rule, like Homer Plessy, Plaintiff is disqualified to appear even for one turn (pro hac vice). Plaintiff’s federally induced injury dehumanizes her; it is a historical vestige stemming from the discredited separate-but-equal culture; identifying and cloaking her, and her family with the stigma of congenital inferiority; denying her equal employment opportunity, segregating and pre-judging her as a second-class citizen, defaming her and tens of thousands highly qualified federal practice lawyers, fencing off free access to the Courts for already unrepresented minorities, reaffirming Plessy v. Ferguson is good law for bar admission in U.S. District Courts because of “local” Rules the ABA has recommended eliminating 15 years ago.
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
VIOLATION OF 28 U.S.C. § 332(d)(4), 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071(a), 2072(b), FRCP 83
9. Congress has enacted 28 U.S.C. § 332(d)(4), placing on the Judicial Council a mandatory duty to periodically review the Federal District Court local rules within their circuit for consistency with 28 U.S.C. § 2071(a), and 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b), and to abrogate any local Rule found inconsistent. Plaintiffs filed an administrative petition with the Ninth Circuit Judicial Council on October 8, 2009, with supporting exhibits and legal citations. Plaintiffs have not received any response. Plaintiffs have not even received an acknowledgment of filing. We can think of attention as
a limited resource having a size, capacity, or load. Federal judges already have a million things to attend in keeping up with their docket and have difficulty attending to all of their duties, in large part because of judicial vacancies. As of May 3, 2010 there are currently 104 vacancies out of 876 Article III judges. Judicial emergencies have been declared in 40 of these vacancies; an emergency in the District Court is defined as where the vacancy has existed over 18 months, and each judge is expected to decide 600 cases per year. According to Judicial Conference records there are presently three judicial vacancies on the Ninth Circuit that have been pending a weighted average of 836 days. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. has declared there is constitutional crisis that has been ignored far too long that undermines the integrity of the right to access to the courts. This constitutional crisis affects all litigants who seek access to the Courts in a United States of America that is further burdened by an economic crisis.
10. Section 2071(a) mandates that local Rules “shall be consistent.” Section 2071(a) now expressly incorporates by reference the § 2072(b) standard of review. That standard is local “(R)ules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right.” This is a revolutionary change because the standard of review for Federal District Court “local” Rules is now heightened. Prior case law held the standard of review is rational basis. Moreover, all of the admission rules proscribed under § 2072(b) provide reciprocal general admission. FRAP 45, Supreme Court 5; 5 U.S.C. § 500 (practice before federal agencies).
11. Below is a graphic depiction of District Court “local”
admission rules. They are not uniform and they are not consistent with the National Rules as is required by 28 U.S.C. § 2071(a). The challenged patchwork of local rules is unlawful because they abridge, enlarge and modify the substantive rights located in the Bill of Rights, and others such as the statutory right to counsel in the federal courts.
12. The hypothesis that State admission is a necessary attribute of U.S. District Court bar members, in order to provide for supervision of the ethics of members of the District Court’s bar is false. Barnard v. Thorstenn, 489 U.S. 546 (1989) held the Virgin Islands justification for discrimination against sister-state attorneys that it did not have the resources to police a nationwide bar membership was insubstantial. Tens of thousands of attorneys are reciprocally admitted in State and federal courts on the basis of a certificate of good standing, or an affirmation that the attorney is a member of the bar in good standing.
VIOLATION OF THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE
13. Under the Supremacy Clause, procedural rules created by the judiciary cannot shrink or expand the scope of federal jurisdiction. Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 370 (1978); U.S. v. Sadler, 480 F.3d 932, 937 (9th Cir, 2007). State law has virtually nothing whatsoever to do with many exclusive areas of federal jurisdiction and highly specialized substantive areas of law including patents, trademarks, copyrights, bankruptcy, taxation, securities, and admiralty. Federal courts are bound to apply rules enacted by Congress over which it has legislative power. Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp. 487 U.S. 22, 26 (1988). The “local” rules violate the Supremacy Clause by shrinking federal jurisdiction and conflating State jurisdiction with federal jurisdiction.
14. The power of the States to control the practice of law cannot be exercised so as to abrogate federally protected rights. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); Sperry v. Florida, 373 U.S. 379 (1963). The California Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized it has no right to determine who is admitted to the federal bar. See, e.g.
In re McCue 211 Cal. 57 (1930). States simply do not have nor should they have jurisdiction over federal bar admission. And Federal District Courts do not have the constitutional or statutory right to limit their own jurisdiction, by delegating federal jurisdiction over federal bar admissions to the state.
15. In US. v Ruehle, 583 F.3d 600 (9th Cir. 2009), the Court reversed a California District Judge invoking California State law on attorney-client privilege, holding under the Federal Rules of Evidence the federal common law of privilege is applicable. The federal common law is admission on motion: FRAP 46, Supreme Court Rule 5, 5 U.S.C. § 500(b), Multidistrict Litigation Rule 1.4, and Local Rules in 34 Federal District Courts. The District Court local rules in the Ninth Circuit that deny reciprocity invades the attorney-client privilege by relying on State law rather than federal law.
16. “In the realm of private speech or expression, government regulation may not favor one speaker over another.” Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 828 (1995). This inversion of the Supremacy Clause, i.e. making State law superior to the Rules Enabling Act, the Constitution, and the Supreme Court’s decision in Friedman, supra (holding admission on motion is constitutionally protected), warrants entry of a consent decree or stipulated judgment for the plaintiffs.
17. Requiring experienced attorneys to undergo the burdensome ritual of taking another State bar exam to obtain District Court admission opens the door to State content discrimination and censorship, similar to what would occur if experienced federal judges were required to be re-confirmed by Congress every time a new President was elected. It is a prior restraint on Plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights, including the right to petition U.S. District Courts. Supreme Court decisions warn of the dangers of government censorship by licensing officials. “A law or policy permitting communication in a certain manner for some but not for others raises the specter of content and viewpoint censorship. This danger is at its zenith when the determination of who may speak and who may not is left to the unbridled discretion of a government official.” See Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co. 486 U.S. 750, 763 (1988). “A scheme conditioning expression on a licensing body's prior approval of content presents peculiar dangers to constitutionally protected speech.” Thomas v. Chicago Park Dist., 534 U.S. 316, 321 (2002).
VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS
18. Neither the Ninth Circuit Judicial Council nor the U.S. District Courts have examined the empirical data underlying the California attorney’s exam.
Standard 1.10 provides,
“Users should be given sufficient guidance to enable them to judge the degree of confidence warranted for any use or interpretation recommended by the test developer. Test manuals and score reports should discourage over interpretations of information that may be subject to considerable error. This is especially important if interpretation of performance on isolated items, small subsets of items, or subtest scores is suggested.”
19. The Standards also emphasize that evaluating acceptability (of a test) involves (a) professional judgment that is based on a knowledge of behavioral science, psychometrics, and the community standards in the professional field to which the tests apply; (b) the degree to which the intent of the standard has been satisfied by the test developer and user; (c) the alternatives that are readily available (emphasis added); and (d) research and experimental evidence regarding feasibility of meeting the standard."
Plaintiffs therefore request the following relief:
- An Order abrogating U.S. District Court “local” Rules in the Ninth Circuit that deny general admission privileges to plaintiffs and other non—forum sister-state attorneys.
- An Order declaring Federal District Court “local” Rules that deny general admission privileges to non-forum State attorneys is unlawful.
Stephen Hawking, A Brief History of Time 2nd. Ed, p. 5 (1998 Bantam)
The Standards for Educational and Psychological Testing (1999) (Published by the American Educational Research Association, American Psychological Association, and the National Council on Measurement in Education) (Standards) were developed “to provide criteria for the evaluation of tests, testing practices, and the effects of test use.” Id. at p. 2. “When tests are at issue in legal proceedings and other venues requiring expert witness testimony it is essential that professional judgment be based on the accepted corpus of knowledge in determining the relevance of particular standards in a given situation. The intent of the Standards is to offer guidance for such judgments.” Id. at 4.